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HEALTH LAW-THE ARKANSAS RESIDENT'S RIGHTS STATUTE AND CIVIL
ENFORCEMENT--CUTTING OFF ITS NOSE To SPITE ITS FACE: How THE
ARKANSAS RESIDENT'S RIGHTS STATUTE IS DEFEATING ITS PURPOSE OF
IMPROVING QUALITY OF CARE TO NURSING HOME RESIDENTS BY
CRIPPLING THE NURSING HOMES THEMSELVES. Health Facilities
Management Corp. v. Hughes, No. 05-90, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122 (Feb. 9,
2006).
I. INTRODUCTION
America is facing a crisis in long-term care.' As the elderly population
grows, there is an increasing need for quality nursing-home care.2 Yet re-
ports continue to surface that reveal mismanagement, negligence, and even
abuse taking place in nursing homes, outraging the nation.3 A "get tough on
the nursing home industry" platform is thus an appealing platform for politi-
cal hopefuls. In Arkansas, this theme is particularly potent: during the 2006
elections, for example, candidates for governor and attorney general brought
nursing-home issues to the forefront of their campaigns and called for in-
creased scrutiny of the industry through increased litigation and legislation,
allowing for the use of "granny cams."4 In the face of rising regulation and
litigation, the nursing-home industry is struggling to stay afloat financially,
compounding the problems regarding quality of care.5
It is clear that there are major problems in long-term care, but the real
question is how to best address these problems.6 Instead of taking a cautious,
thoughtful approach to the crisis, it seems that many lawmakers promote
any and all legislation aimed at improving the quality of care for nursing-
1. See generally Michael L. Rustad, Heart of Stone: What Is Revealed About the Atti-
tude of Compassionate Conservatives Toward Nursing Home Practices, Tort Reform, and
Noneconomic Damages, 35 N.M. L. REv. 337 (2005).
2. Susan J. Hemp, The Right to a Remedy: When Should an Abused Nursing Home
Resident Sue?, 2 ELDER L.J. 195, 199 (1994).
3. See generally Jennifer N. Phan, The Graying of America: Protecting Nursing Home
Residents by Allowing Regulatory and Criminal Statutes to Establish Standards of Care in
Private Negligence Actions, 2002 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 297 (2002).
4. See, e.g., Jake Bleed, Hutchinson to Push for Funds for Elderly; Beebe, for Housing,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, June 6, 2006; Daniel Nasaw, Hopeful Speaks for Greens in At-
torney General Debate, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Oct. 11, 2006. Opponents criticize
"granny cams" as a tactic by plaintiffs' attorneys to provide courtroom evidence. Jennifer
Gimler Brady, Long-Term Care Under Fire: A Case for Rational Enforcement, 18 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 41 (2001).
5. Roger Hughlett, Healthcare: Nursing Homes Battle State Officials over Medicaid,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 21, 1999, at BM 19.
6. Brady, supra note 4, at 3.
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home residents without regard for the impact such legislation has on the
very institutions providing that care.7 As a result, the combination of heavy
regulations and increasingly expensive litigation is overwhelming the nurs-
ing-home industry without improving the quality of care.8 As insurance rates
increase due to rising litigation, nursing homes find themselves in a "Catch
22": they cannot afford to provide the quality of care mandated by regula-
tions, but any breach in care leads to litigation and further financial difficul-
ties.9 Legislators must find a way to improve the quality of care to residents
and to rehabilitate the nursing home industry at the same time.10 Debilitating
nursing homes will not solve the problem."
Arkansas's current path in nursing-home regulation is leading to the
destruction of its nursing-home system.' 2 In particular, the Arkansas Resi-
dent's Rights Statute favors plaintiffs and allows for high damage awards. 3
The statute's civil enforcement provision lacks guidelines for the application
of the statute or the award of damages. 4 In February of 2006, the Arkansas
Supreme Court decided Health Facilities Management Corp. v. Hughes,5 a
nursing home case concerning the Arkansas Resident's Rights Statute. The
court's decision on the issue of liability under the statute was well-reasoned
and stayed faithful to the goals of the statute, encouraging nursing-home
licensees to live up to their responsibilities. However, while the court could
have decided the case so as to clarify the statute and give guidance to the
parties involved, the court's decision only contributed to the ambiguity on
the issue of damages. In the decision, the court laid out a vague standard for
the statute's application that seems to overlap with traditional negligence
law and gives juries exceedingly broad discretion in assessing compensatory
damages under the statute.'6
Arkansas should reform its Resident's Rights Statute to achieve its goal
of improving the quality of life of nursing-home residents while limiting
injury to the industry providing the residents with care. The reformed statute
should limit large jury awards and establish clear, straightforward, and just
standards for the application of the statute and the assessment of damages.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 4. "One must question the wisdom of imposing another layer of regulation on
an industry that already is overwhelmed by federal and state mandates." Id.
9. See id. at 43.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id.
12. See generally Hughlett, supra note 5.
13. ARK. CODEANN. § 20-10-1201 (LEXIS Supp. 2005).
14. Id. at § 20-10-1209 (LEXIS Supp. 2005).
15. No. 05-90, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122 (Feb. 9, 2006).
16. See generally id.
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This note will begin by looking at the facts of the case at hand, Health
Facilities Management Corp. v. Hughes.7 The note will then provide the
reader with a background that includes the state of the nursing-home indus-
try, different approaches to problems in long-term care, and the state of Ar-
kansas's laws and litigation regarding nursing homes.18 Next, the note will
look at the Arkansas Supreme Court's reasoning in Health Facilities Man-
agement Corp.'9 Finally, the note will discuss the significance of that case
and will call for a change in Arkansas's approach to nursing home litiga-
tion.2"
II. FACTS
Mary Hughes, as executrix of the estate of Mildred Smith ("Estate"),
brought a lawsuit against Health Facilities Management Corp., Little Rock
Healthcare, Inc., and Little Rock Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center,
claiming damages for injuries and death suffered by Ms. Smith from the
care and treatment given by Little Rock Healthcare and Rehabilitation Cen-
ter.21 Ms. Smith moved to Little Rock Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center
("Nursing Home") in January 1997.22 During Ms. Smith's time there, her
niece, Ms. Hughes, regularly visited Ms. Smith in order to monitor her con-
dition.23 Although Ms. Smith needed help with bathing and dressing, she
was capable of feeding herself and was able to hold a conversation. 4 There
were no reports of problems with Ms. Smith's care at the Nursing Home
until an incident on August 3, 1999, after Ms. Smith had been living at the
facility for more than two years.
On August 3, 1999, the Nursing Home transported Ms. Smith, who was
accompanied by Ms. Hughes, in one of the Nursing Home's vans to a dental
appointment.26 During the journey, and in an effort to avoid an accident, the
employee driving the van slammed on the brakes. 27 Ms. Smith was not se-
cured in her wheelchair, and the sudden stop threw her from her wheelchair
and caused her to hit her head and face on the seat in front of her.28 The van
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *1, 3-4.
22. Id. at *1.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Brief of Appellant at Soc 1, Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 2006 Ark.
LEXIS 122 (Feb. 9, 2006) (No. 05-90).
26. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *1-2.
27. Id. at *2.
28. Id.
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returned to the Nursing Home with Ms. Smith remaining on the van floor.29
Following this incident, Ms. Smith began to experience medical problems.3"
Three days after the accident, Ms. Smith's physician discovered that
Ms. Smith had fractured her tibia during the accident. 3' Additionally, Ms.
Smith began to experience emotional trouble.32 She did not speak as much,
and her eating habits changed.33 In September 1999, the Nursing Home gave
Ms. Smith a feeding tube in an effort to counteract her significant weight
lOSS. 34 Furthermore, Ms. Smith was bed-bound and began to develop pres-
sure sores. 5 Former employees of the Nursing Home later testified at trial
that they found Ms. Smith in uncomfortable positions, such as lying in her
own urine, on several occasions.36 The Estate's- expert witness, a nurse prac-
titioner, testified at trial that Ms. Smith's lower extremities became con-
tracted and that she suffered from dehydration as a result of substandard
care on the Nursing Home's part.37 The expert also believed that Ms. Smith
had her first skin breakdown about thirteen days after the van incident and,
as a result, became more immobile.38 The expert further pointed to problems
in the Nursing Home's records indicating its failure to take a "proactive
approach" to Ms. Smith's decreasing weight and failure to turn her often
enough.39
On August 23, 1999, doctors diagnosed Ms. Smith with a urinary tract
infection, but she did not receive treatment until September 3, 1999.4" Six
months later, on March 21, 2000, the Nursing Home admitted Ms. Smith to
St. Vincent's Medical Center ("St. Vincent's") after noticing she had a high
fever and was unresponsive." Upon admission, St. Vincent's documented
that Ms. Smith suffered from contractures that could have been prevented
had Ms. Smith been provided with range-of-motion therapy.4 2 On March 26,
2000, Ms. Smith died at St. Vincent's while still undergoing treatment from
her admission on March 21, 2000."3 Both the Estate's expert and St. Vin-
cent's death summary indicated that the cause of death was an infection
29. Id.
30. Brief of Appellant, supra note 25, at Soc 1.
31. Id.
32. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *2.
33. Id.
34. Brief of Appellant, supra note 25, at Soc 1.
35. Id.
36. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *2.
37. Brief of Appellant, supra note 25, at Soc 1.
38. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *2.
39. Id. at *3.
40. Id.
41. Brief of Appellant, supra note 25, at Soc 1.
42. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *3.
43. Id.
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from sepsis that developed from a bedsore on Ms. Smith's right hip." How-
ever, the official death certificate named end-stage coronary artery disease
as the cause of death.45
Ms. Hughes, as executrix of Ms. Smith's estate, filed a complaint on
February 22, 2002, against Little Rock Healthcare ("Healthcare"), owner of
the Nursing Home, and Health Facilities Management Corporation ("Man-
agement"), a consulting company contracted to manage the facility. 6 The
complaint claimed four causes of action against Healthcare and Manage-
ment: negligence, medical malpractice, wrongful death, and violations of the
Arkansas Resident's Rights Statute.4 ' The complaint requested compensato-
ry and punitive damages.48
On January 20, 2003, Management filed a motion for summary judg-
ment for the Resident's Rights Statute and medical malpractice claims.4 9
Management argued that the trial court should dismiss the Resident's Rights
Statute claim as a matter of law because the statute's language created a
cause of action only against a "licensee" of a long-term care facility.50 Spe-
cifically, Management argued that because Healthcare, and not Manage-
ment, held the license for the Nursing Home, the Estate could not sustain
such a claim against it.51 Management further argued that the medical mal-
practice claim should be dismissed because Management was not a medical
provider.52 The trial court denied summary judgment on both claims.53 Man-
agement moved for a directed verdict on the Estate's Resident's Rights Sta-
tute claim, citing the licensure issue, as well as claiming that the Estate had
failed to meet its burden of proof.5 4 Healthcare also moved for a directed
verdict for failure of proof.5 Both defendants renewed their motions for
directed verdict. 5
6
After a one-week jury trial in April 2004, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the Estate on the negligence claim against Healthcare and on the
Resident's Rights Statute claim against both Healthcare and Management. 7
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *3-4.
47. Id. at *4.
48. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *4.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at *4--5. Management and Healthcare were successful on a motion in limine
regarding evidence as to the ownership of the companies. Id. at *5.
54. Brief of Appellant, supra note 25, at Soc 2.
55. Id.
56. Id. at Soc 3.
57. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *5.
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However, the jury found in favor of the defendants on the Estate's other
causes of action. 8 The jury assessed damages against Healthcare in the
amount of $38,000 for negligence and $700,000 for violation of the Resi-
dent's Rights Statute.59 The Estate received a $1.25 million verdict against
Management for violations of the Resident's Rights Statute.'
Both Healthcare and Management filed a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur, fol-
lowing the jury's verdict. 6' At a hearing on June 25, 2004, the trial court
denied those motions.62 On July 8, 2004, Healthcare and Management filed
notices of appeal.63 Management appealed the judgement on the grounds
that it was not a licensee and therefore not a proper defendant for the Resi-
dent's Rights Statute claim.6' Healthcare and Management both appealed the
verdicts against them on the Resident's Rights Statute claim on the ground
that there was no evidence to support a verdict finding a violation in light of
the jury's findings in favor of the defendants on the medical malpractice and
wrongful death claims.65
III. BACKGROUND
Nursing-home care is a vitally important sector of the healthcare indus-
try.66 Following World War II, demand for nursing-home care for the elderly
and chronically ill increased, and the industry responded. 67 The federal gov-
ernment's enactment of Medicare and Medicaid legislation further bolstered
the expanding industry and helped make care more available.6' As demand
and availability grew, nursing homes developed into big business, as subsid-
iaries of large, for-profit corporate chains replaced traditional mom-and-pop
facilities. 69 Unfortunately, nursing-home care was, and is, expensive, de-
manding on personnel, and highly regulated, thus making it difficult for the
nursing-home companies to both make a profit and meet the needs of resi-
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at *6.
62. Id. at *6 n.2.
63. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *6.
64. Brief of Appellant, supra note 25, at Soc 3.
65. Id.
66. Jennifer L. Williamson, The Siren Song of the Elderly: Florida's Nursing Homes
and the Dark Side of Chapter 400, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 423, 423 (1999).
67. Hemp, supra note 2, at 199.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 200.
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dents.7" The business needs of facilities and the physical and emotional
needs of residents often come into conflict, resulting in sub-standard care. 1
As the baby-boom generation grows older and America faces a "profound
demographic shift," the need to provide quality care to elderly Americans is
now more essential than ever.
72
This section will begin with a look at the state of the nursing-home in-
dustry today and the problems it faces.73 Next, there will be a discussion of
the traditional causes of action available to plaintiffs wishing to redress
wrongs committed by nursing homes.74 After exposing the flaws in many of
those traditional means, this section will proceed with an examination of
legislative reforms to nursing-home regulation and litigation at the federal
and state level, with a particular focus on the approach Florida has taken.75
The section will then focus on Arkansas's nursing home legislation and liti-
gation, including a look at a pivotal nursing-home case decided before the
enactment of the Resident's Rights Statute, and will give a brief history of
the development of the Resident's Rights Statute and an examination of its
provisions.76 Finally, this section will look at Koch v. Northport Health Ser-
vices of Arkansas,7  a Resident's Rights Statute case decided by the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court prior to the case at issue in this note, Health Facilities
Management Corp. v. Hughes.78
A. The State of the Industry
In the face of rising costs, regulations, and the "dramatic upswing in lit-
igation aimed at the quality of care provided by nursing homes,"7 9 nursing
homes have faced difficulty in consistently providing quality care to the
growing population of residents.8" Operating on limited budgets, facilities
are often under-staffed.81 Moreover, the staff maintained is typically under-
70. Symposium, "The Crisis in Long Term Care": Federal Law Enforcement in Long
Term Care, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 230, 253 (2002).
71. Id. at250-51.
72. Id. at 251.
73. See infra Part III.A.
74. See infra Part TII.B.
75. See infra Part III.C.
76. See infra Part III.D.
77. 361 Ark. 192,205 S.W.3d 754 (2005).
78. No. 05-90, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122 (Feb. 9, 2006).
79. Brady, supra note 4, at 4.
80. Robin P. Bravchok, Nursing Home Tort Reform and Ohio House Bill 412: Why
Have We Abandoned Our Neglected and Abused Elderly Population?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
645, 649 (2002).
81. Id.
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trained, and turnover rates are high.82 Meanwhile, insurance companies have
reacted to increases in nursing-home litigation and rising jury awards by
raising insurance rates.83 Plaintiffs are receiving substandard care on a regu-
lar basis, and the nursing homes themselves are constantly under fire from
legislation, litigation, and regulation.84
B. Traditional Causes of Action Against Nursing Homes
Nursing-home residents have always had standing to sue nursing
homes under traditional theories, such as negligence, medical malpractice,
and wrongful death.85 Nursing homes owe a duty of care to their residents,
including the duty to conform with federal and state quality standards.8 6
However, there are problems unique to nursing-home litigation that make
meeting the standard of proof and recovering damages difficult.87 Typically,
residents who are nearing the end of their lives suffer from multiple illnesses
and conditions, any one of which may contribute to or cause pain, suffering,
and death.88 And, although a nursing home may breach a duty of care to a
resident, a plaintiff may not be able to prove that the nursing home caused
any injury."
Furthermore, traditional damages for negligence, medical malpractice,
and wrongful death, such as loss of income and loss of life expectancy, do
not apply to many nursing home residents.9" Compensation for pain and
suffering is one viable route to damages, but in the case of a deceased resi-
dent or one who is already in a great deal of pain, quantifying "pain and
suffering" is problematic. 91 Further, although punitive damage awards are
growing, they are typically available only when a nursing home's miscon-
82. Id. Staffing problems are also present at the provider level in which anxieties "re-
garding potential negative legal entanglements and repercussions associated with the provi-
sion of [end of life] care" is prevalent. Marshall B. Kapp, Legal Anxieties and End-of-Life
Care in Nursing Homes, 19 ISSUES L. & MED. 111, 112-13 (2003).
83. Kapp, supra note 82, at 123.
84. Alexander D. Eremia, When Self-Regulation, Market Forces, and Private Legal
Actions Fail: Appropriate Government Regulation and Oversight Is Necessary to Ensure
Minimum Standards of Quality in Long-Term Health Care, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 93, 93-96
(2002).
85. Rustad, supra note 1, at 352-53.
86. Id.
87. See generally Jeffrey Spitzer-Resnick & Maya Krajcinovic, Protecting the Rights of
Nursing Home Residents: How Tort Liability Interacts with Statutory Protections, 19 NOVA
L. REv. 629 (1995).
88. Hemp, supra note 2, at 213.
89. Id.
90. See Spitzer-Resnick & Krajcinovic, supra note 87, at 630-36.
91. Rustad, supra note 1, at 355.
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duct is "intentional, malicious, recklessly indifferent to patient safety, or at
least grossly negligent. 92
C. Legislative Reforms
Due to the importance of nursing homes to the healthcare industry and
the delicate nature of nursing-home care, the nursing-home industry is high-
ly regulated.93 Increasingly, state governments have used litigation reforms
as a regulatory tool, to varying degrees. 94 Some states allow plaintiffs to sue
nursing homes directly to seek financial retribution, while others use litiga-
tion as a way of policing the nursing home industry without inflicting a great
deal of financial harm on the industry.95 This subsection will begin with a
glance at the federal government's role in increasing nursing home regula-
tion via litigation.96 It will then look at the varied approaches of four states:
New York, Wisconsin, Missouri, and Florida, with a particular focus on
Florida's approach.97
1. The Federal Government
The federal government became involved with the nursing home indus-
try in 1965, when Congress set minimum standards for nursing homes wish-
ing to receive Medicare and Medicaid funding.98 At the same time, the Se-
nate Select Committee on Aging formed its Subcommittee on Health and
Long-Term Care. 99 However, it was not until two decades later that Con-
gress responded to growing societal concerns about the quality of nursing-
home care by enacting the Nursing Home Reform Amendments Act as a
part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA'87). 00
OBRA'87 put into federal law the first "Bill of Rights" for nursing-home
residents and established minimum "quality of life" standards for all nursing
homes receiving Medicare or Medicaid funds."'
Although OBRA'87 did not specifically create a private right of action
for nursing-home residents, some courts interpreted the law as implying
such a right.'02 The Supreme Court set up a test for determining whether or
92. Id. at 357-58.
93. Spitzer-Resnick & Krajcinovic, supra note 87, at 630-31.
94. See Phan, supra note 3, at 326.
95. See infra Part I11.C.2.
96. See infra Part III.C. 1.
97. See infra Part III.C.2.
98. Hemp, supra note 2, at 203.
99. Id.
100. Spitzer-Resnick & Krajcinovic, supra note 87, at 632.
101. 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.13, 483.15 (2000).
102. Spitzer-Resnick & Krajcinovic, supra note 87, at 632.
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not a particular act of legislation carries with it an implied cause of action in
the case of Cort v. Ash.' °3 Applying that test to OBRA'87 allowed courts to
find an implied private right of action based on OBRA'87's bill of rights.""
The need for state courts to use the federal law decreased in importance,
however, in light of growing state regulation of nursing homes.'05
2. Action at the State Level
Taking up where the federal government left off, individual states
crafted their own legislation to bolster the rights of nursing-home resi-
dents. 06 The goal of state legislation was the same as that of the federal leg-
islation: to improve the quality of care for nursing-home residents while at
the same time increasing the accountability of the nursing homes them-
selves.'0 7 Yet, individual states took varied approaches to accomplishing this
goal.'08 For example, while some states introduced procedural checks to
nursing-home abuses, others increased the role of litigation as a tool for
nursing-home regulation.0 9 New York, Wisconsin, Missouri, and Florida
provide representative examples of the latter approach."0
a. New York
New York's approach to nursing-home regulation included creating a
private right of action for nursing-home residents whose resident's rights
had been violated by their nursing homes."' The most unique feature of
New York's legislation, however, is the fact that it sets a minimum for com-
pensatory damages in such cases."2 Under the New York law, a prevailing
plaintiff is guaranteed to receive at least twenty-five percent of the daily per-
patient rate at the facility or the average daily total charges per patient for
103. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Court set forth a four-part test for determining whether
legislation implies a right of action: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the protected
class; (2) whether legislative intent indicates Congress intended to create a private remedy;
(3) whether implying such a remedy would be consistent with the law's purpose; and (4)
whether the cause of action is "traditionally relegated to state law," suggesting that federal
intervention would be inappropriate. Id. at 78.
104. Spitzer-Resnick & Krajcinovic, supra note 87, at 632.
105. See id. at 633-36; see also infra Part III.C.2.
106. See Spitzer-Resnick & Krajcinovic, supra note 87, at 632-33; see also infra Part
III.C.2.
107. See Spitzer-Resnick & Krajcinovic, supra note 87, at 630; see also infra Part III.C.2.
108. Spitzer-Resnick & Krajcinovic, supra note 87, at 633-36.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2801 -d(1)--(10) (McKinney 1993).
112. Id. § 2801-d(2).
606 [Vol. 29
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the facility for each day the resident suffered injury."3 In addition, a resident
may seek punitive damages if the nursing home acted willfully or "in reck-
less disregard of the lawful rights of the patient.""' 4 New York's legislation
provides a powerful tool for nursing-home residents, but New York courts
have limited this tool by applying the statute and its minimum damages only
in cases involving violation of a right or benefit specifically set out within
the resident's bill of rights, and not in cases of ordinary negligence." 5
b. Wisconsin
Like New York, Wisconsin also created a private right of action for
nursing-home residents." 6 However, Wisconsin's enforcement procedure is
less potent and is limited to equitable relief."7 Residents whose rights are
violated can either seek mandamus against the state regulatory agency to
order it to enforce its regulations, or they can seek an injunction against ei-
ther the nursing home itself or the Department of Health and Social Servic-
es.1" Therefore, plaintiffs seeking to recover damages from a nursing home
in Wisconsin must still use traditional causes of action." 9 The right to seek
mandamus or injunctive relief does, however, provide a method of regulat-
ing nursing homes through the judicial system, without subjecting nursing
homes to direct, financial penalties for violations of resident's rights. 2 °
c. Missouri
In formulating its resident's rights legislation, Missouri made a cau-
tious move toward allowing private citizens more involvement in regulating
nursing homes.' 2' Missouri's resident's rights statute creates a private right
of action, but the right does not arise immediately.'22 First, a plaintiff must
seek administrative relief by filing a written complaint with the state attor-
ney general.'23 Under the statute, the attorney general has sixty days to begin
state legal action on the complaint. 4 In the event that the attorney general
takes no action, the plaintiff can then proceed against the nursing home un-
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Begandy v. Richardson, 510 N.Y.S.2d 984, 987 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
116. Spitzer-Resnick & Krajcinovic, supra note 87, at 633.
117. Compare N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-d(i)-(10) with WIS. STAT. § 50.10 (2003).
118. WIS. STAT. § 50.10(2).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 198.093 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1994).
122. Id. at 1-3.
123. Id. at 1.
124. Id. at 2-3.
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der the statutory cause of action and seek damages. 25 Unlike Wisconsin,
Missouri allows for an award of damages, but punitive damages are limited
to the larger of either five times the compensatory damages awarded or five-
hundred dollars. 1
26
d. Florida
Florida has the highest elderly population of any state. 127 Therefore, it
has a significant need for quality nursing-home care. 28 In 1995, Florida
enacted a civil enforcement provision for the Residents' Rights Act (RRA)
to protect its many elderly citizens living in nursing homes. 2 9 This allow-
ance of civil enforcement of a resident's rights led to widespread, expensive
nursing-home litigation, ultimately resulting in a rise in liability insurance
rates that heavily burdened Florida's nursing-home industry. 3' In 2001, the
Florida legislature amended the RRA in recognition of the impact the law
had on Florida's nursing-home system.'3' Because Arkansas modeled its
own Resident's Rights Statute on Florida's original RRA, this section will
take an in-depth look at the RRA, the problems it caused, and the 2001 re-
forms aimed at solving those problems.'32
i. Provisions of the RRA
The RRA's civil enforcement provision originally allowed plaintiffs to
sue nursing homes for actual and punitive damages resulting from violations
of the RRA.133 It also provided for the award of attorney's fees to successful
plaintiffs, making such litigation more appealing to plaintiffs' attorneys.' 34
The civil enforcement provision also made it easier to win higher damages
because a plaintiff could collect on a RRA claim in addition to any other
common law claim, such as wrongful death.'35
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. Williamson, supra note 66, at 430.
128. Id.
129. See FLA. STAT. § 400.023 (1995) (amended 2001).
130. Tom J. Manos, Florida's Nursing Home Reform and Its Anticipated Effect on Litiga-
tion, 75 FLA. B. J. 18, 18 (2001).
131. Id. at 18-20.
132. Theo Francis, Nursing-Home Bill Pushes Residents' Rights, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Jan. 27, 1999, at D1.
133. Troy J. Crotts & Daniel A. Martinez, The Nursing Home Residents' Rights Act-A
GoodIdea Gone Bad!, 26 STETSON L. REv. 599, 608 (1996).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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ii. Reform of the RRA
The civil enforcement provision of the RRA "opened the floodgates" of
nursing home litigation in Florida.'36 Nursing home suits grew in number
and value, leading insurance companies to withdraw from Florida in the face
of rising liability. 37 Without insurance, Florida's nursing-home industry was
in trouble. 3s As a result, in 2000, Florida's legislature established a task
force to look into improving the state of the nursing-home industry. 39 The
task force's report eventually led to the 2001 reforms. 40 The new act con-
tained several reforms; however, this section will address only some of the
reforms dealing with limitations on damages and the establishment of a clear
standard of proof.1
4
'
To begin with, the reformed act requires that a plaintiff claiming dam-
ages under the RRA for a deceased resident must choose to receive either
survival damages or wrongful death damages. 42 This reform limits compen-
satory damages in cases of death. 4 The RRA also contains an express pro-
vision limiting punitive damages to cases in which the defendant is "perso-
nally guilty of intentional misconduct or gross negligence.'"" If a plaintiff
meets that high standard, any punitive damages awarded may not exceed the
greater of four times the compensatory damages or four-million dollars."
41
Second, the RRA established a clear standard of proof for RRA claims:
The claimant shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence, that:
(a) The defendant owed a duty to the resident;
(b) The defendant breached the duty to the resident;
(c) The breach of the duty is a legal cause of loss, injury, death, or
damage to the resident; and
136. Manos, supra note 130, at 19.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 20.
140. Id.
141. Florida also reformed its allowance of attorney's fees. FLA. STAT. § 400.023(1)
(2006). Under the new RRA, attorney's fees are recoverable only in circumstances in which
the plaintiff seeks injunctive or an administrative remedy. Id.
142. Id.
143. Manos, supra note 130, at 21.
144. FLA. STAT. § 400.023(2) (2006); see also Manos, supra note 130, at 27.
145. FLA. STAT. § 400.023(1)(b)1-2 (2006); Manos, supra note 130, at 27.
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(d) The resident sustained loss, injury, death, or damage as a result of
the breach. 1
46
This reform cleared up confusion in Florida courts about the plaintiffs
burden in nursing-home cases involving the RRA.'47 Under the RRA, a
plaintiff must establish each element of negligence; a plaintiff may not
simply point to a violation of the RRA and ask for damages, as was the case
in some lawsuits before 2001.148 There must be actual damages and actual
injury caused by the nursing home.'49
D. Arkansas's Stance
In 1999, Arkansas adopted its own Resident's Rights Statute, modeled
after Florida's version. 50 The Arkansas Resident's Rights Statute creates a
private right of action allowing nursing home plaintiffs to sue nursing homes
for damages resulting from violations of the enumerated resident's rights. 5 '
While the enactment of the Resident's Rights Statute represented a dramatic
shift in favor of plaintiffs, it was not a sudden change.' 52 Even before the
enactment of that statute, nursing-home litigation in Arkansas had become
increasingly expensive, as plaintiffs altered their strategies and juries began
sending messages with their verdicts.'53
This subsection will begin by discussing the state of nursing-home leg-
islation in Arkansas before the advent of the Resident's Rights Statute."'
Next, the subsection will look at the development of the statute and will
examine its provisions, followed by a comparison of Arkansas's statute with
Florida's resident's rights statute, both before and after the reforms.' Final-
ly, this subsection will look at the Arkansas Supreme Court's first applica-
tion of the Resident's Rights Statute in Koch v. Northport Health Services of
Arkansas.1
56
146. FLA. STAT. § 400.023(2) (2006).
147. Manos, supra note 130, at 24.
148. Id. at 25.
149. Id.
150. See generally Francis, supra note 132.
151. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-10-1209 (LEXIS Supp. 2005).
152. See generally Jake Bleed, Special Report: What Price Justice? A Mena Jury's
$78Million Award Has Created an Uproar Among the State's Medical Community Insurance
Providers and Lawyers, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Oct. 6, 2002.
153. See generally id.
154. See infra Part III.D.1.
155. See infra Part III.D.2.
156. 361 Ark. 192, 205 S.W.3d 754 (2005); see infra Part II1.D.2.c.
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1. Nursing Home Litigation Immediately Preceding the Resident's
Rights Statute
In the years leading up to the Resident's Rights Statute, nursing-home
litigation became increasingly intense, with higher stakes and less certain-
ty."7 Plaintiffs seeking to maximize their damages adjusted their strategy to
appeal more to the emotions of jury members, and juries responded by
awarding large, message-sending verdicts.15 This new strategy essentially
put the entire nursing-home industry on trial, instead of focusing on the par-
ticular wrongs committed by a defendant against a single plaintiff.'59 Plain-
tiffs began "capitalizing on the trend by asking juries to use individual cases
to make monumental decisions that [impacted] entire industries or even [es-
tablished] de facto public policy.' 60 Although not unique to the nursing-
home industry, these message-sending verdicts were a new weapon in the
plaintiffs' arsenals.' 6' While the Arkansas Supreme Court kept some of these
awards in check through appellate decisions, the overall trend was to break
away from traditional damages and to move toward more public-policy
based, generalized verdicts.'6 2 The following case, Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer,
163
is one example of this general trend.
The largest jolt to the nursing home industry in Arkansas came on June
29, 2001, when a jury in Mena, Arkansas, awarded seventy-eight million
dollars to the family of Greta Sauer in a suit against a local nursing home,
Rich Mountain Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, and its related corpora-
tions ("Advocat"). 6M The verdict included sixty-three million dollars in pu-
nitive damages, and the remainder in compensatory damages for medical
malpractice and negligence. 6 5 Although the lawsuit did not involve the Res-
ident's Rights Statute, its result was in keeping with that statute's goal of
increasing the effectiveness of civil lawsuits against nursing homes.1
66
The law firm Wilkes & McHugh, which had arrived in Arkansas from
Florida in 1998 with a reputation for "tough litigation and the ability to
157. See generally Bleed, supra note 152.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Mark Curriden, Power of 12: Jurors Increasingly Are Sending Loud Messages of
Censure with Megabuck Verdicts. But Critics Charge that a Jury Is the Least Qualified Body
to Decide Public Policy, 87 A.B.A.J. 36, 36 (2001) (describing how juries across the country
began sending messages to specific industries, such as the tobacco industry and pharmaceuti-
cal companies, with megabuck verdicts).
161. See id.
162. See generally Bleed, supra note 152.
163. 353 Ark. 29, 111 S.W.3d 346 (2003).
164. Id. at 38, 111 S.W.3d at 350.
165. Id. at40, 111 S.W.3dat 351.
166. See id., 11 S.W.3d at 351.
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wring high-dollar verdicts from nursing homes[]" tried the case for the
plaintiff. 67 The firm's approach was to focus not on proving traditional,
quantifiable forms of loss, but rather on "the intangible value of a victim's
pain and suffering."'68 Furthermore, the firm litigated their cases by stress-
ing a pattern of negligence by "parent corporations and investor demands,"
instead of focusing on the facts of the one particular case at hand and "the
plight of a single individual in a single bed.' ' 169 In the case, the plaintiffs
attorney went so far as to openly ask the jury to send a message to the de-
fendants in his closing statement. 170 This new approach was aggressive, per-
suasive, and artful, placing an emphasis on emotion over reason.
In Sauer, the plaintiff, Mrs. Sauer, died at the age of ninety-three after
suffering from dehydration, bed sores, malnutrition, and Alzheimer's dis-
ease.' 7' The jury assigned fault to Advocat for negligence and medical mal-
practice and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of five million
dollars for negligence and ten million dollars for medical malpractice. 7 2
Advocat immediately appealed the jury's award and argued that, because
Mrs. Sauer's medical bills were only about $7,700, the jury had essentially
given her Estate $14,992,291.50 for her pain and suffering. 173 However, the
Arkansas Supreme Court looked at evidence presented to the jury, including
the condition in which employees of the home had found Mrs. Sauer, and
determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the award. 74 Unfor-
tunately, the court failed to provide a guideline for measuring damages for
pain and suffering. 175 And while the court concluded that the award was not
the result of passion or prejudice, it held that the compensatory damages did
shock the conscience of the court and did merit remittitur from fifteen mil-
lion dollars to five million dollars. 76
Advocat's request for remittitur of the punitive damages award was al-
so successful. 77 Advocat argued that the evidence on the record did not me-
rit the award of punitive damages and that the punitive damages were exces-
167. See generally Bleed, supra note 152. Interestingly, the attorneys for the defendants
left defense practice soon after the verdict and began doing plaintiffs' work against nursing
homes. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Advocat, Inc., 353 Ark. at 39, 111 S.W.3d at 350.
172. Id. at40, 111 S.W.3d at 351.
173. Id. at42, 111 S.W.3d at 352.
174. Id. at 44-45, 111 S.W.3d at 354.
175. Id., 111 S.W.3d at 354. "There is no definite and satisfactory rule to measure com-
pensation for pain and suffering." Id., 111 S.W.3d at 354.
176. Id. at 49, 111 S.W.3d at 357.
177. Advocat, Inc., 353 Ark. at 52, 111 S.W.3d at 359.
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sive and violated Advocat's due process rights. 78 Advocat further contended
that under Arkansas law, punitive damages require proof of "conscious or
reckless disregard of known or probable consequences from which malice
can be inferred."' 179 Due to a technicality, the court did not review this insuf-
ficiency-of-the-evidence argument.' After looking at all of the circums-
tances and considering the fact that Advocat constituted a "major business
enterprise," the court decided that punitive damages were appropriate but
that they should be reduced from sixty-three million dollars to twenty-one
million dollars.'
Although the appeal in Advocat was a victory in many ways for the
nursing-home industry because the award was reduced by over fifty million
dollars, it was also a defeat because it provided no clear standard for the
assessment of damages.8 2 With no clear standard for the measurement of
damages for pain and suffering, the court left the decision up to a jury's un-
limited discretion. 8 3 Even with remittitur as large as the one Advocat re-
ceived in this case, the ultimate award exceeding twenty million dollars suf-
ficed to send a message to the nursing-home industry.
1 84
2. The Resident's Rights Statute
a. Development
The Arkansas Resident's Rights Statute (RRS) developed among many
competing interests, which impacted the application and effectiveness of the
provisions. Is5 The legislature attempted to draft the legislation to improve
conditions for nursing-home residents without overly burdening the regula-
tory system or drastically uprooting the nursing-home industry. 6 A com-
promise between the industry and resident's rights advocates was neces-
sary.8 7 Thus, while the RRS was able to maintain provisions making it easi-
er for nursing-home residents to sue nursing homes, the bill also restricted
178. Id. at 49, 111 S.W.3d at 357.
179. Id., 111 S.W.3d at 357.
180. Id. at 50, 111 S.W.3d at 357.
181. Id. at 52, 111 S.W.3d at 359.
182. Seeid. at23, 111 S.W.3d346.
183. Advocat, Inc., 353 Ark. at 45, 111 S.W.3d at 354.
184. Seeid. at 68-69, 111 S.W.3d 369.
185. See Theo Francis, Changes Take Teeth out of Nursing Home Bill, Critics Say, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Apr. 1, 1999, at Al.
186. See, e.g., id. "State senators who amended the measure say the original bill was
unacceptable to the industry and likely would have died without the changes." Id.
187. Seeid.
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residents by removing a proposed provision for the award of attorneys' fees
to plaintiffs.188
After the passage of the RRS, insurance companies began raising rates
on long-term liability insurance for Arkansas nursing homes. 8 9 These rate
hikes prompted the Arkansas Insurance Department to seek tort reform for
nursing-home litigation in order to protect the industry from further fman-
cial difficulties. 90 In particular, the proposed reform encouraged the idea of
placing a limit on verdicts.' 9' That idea floundered, but in 2003, the nursing-
home industry once again sought added protection, this time through law-
suit-limiting amendments to the RRS.' 92 The Arkansas Senate Judiciary
Committee considered a bill proposing measures that would limit lawsuits,
such as a bar on the admission of documents reporting a nursing home's
violations of the rights of a party other than the plaintiff.193 Reacting to an
anti-nursing-home outcry, the Committee instead passed a bill allowing such
documents to be used in nursing-home litigation.194 Additionally, the bill
increased the minimum insurance coverage requirements for nursing
homes.' 95 The revisions, "proposed to kill the bill and strip the bill," were
not included in the final versions of the bill; however, they revealed a high
level of outrage against the nursing-home industry in Arkansas. 96
b. Provisions
The RRS consists of nine main sections that are intended "to provide
for the development, establishment, and enforcement of basic standards for[]
(1) [t]he health, care, and treatment of persons in long-term care facilities;
and (2) [t]he construction, maintenance, and operation of these facilities[,]
which will ensure safe, adequate, and appropriate care, treatment, and health
of persons in the facilities."'' 97 The RRS attempts to achieve this goal by
laying out twenty-one rights owed by nursing homes to nursing-home resi-
dents, which mirror those contained in the federal Resident's Bill of
188. Id.
189. David Smith, Insurance Chief Blasted for Idea on Tort Reform, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Oct. 9, 2001, at D1.
190. Id. (suggesting that recent million-dollar verdicts affected insurance prices).
191. Id.
192. Seth Blomeley, Nursing-Home Bill Loses Lawsuit Limits, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Apr. 11, 2003, at 23.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-10-1201 (LEXIS Supp. 2005).
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Rights. !98 The final section of the RRS, entitled "Civil enforcement," pro-
vides as follows:
(a)(1) Any resident who is injured by a deprivation or infringement of
his or her rights as specified in this subchapter may bring a cause of ac-
tion against any licensee responsible for the deprivation or infringement.
(4) The resident may seek to recover actual damages when there is a
finding that an employee of the long-term care facility failed to do some-
thing [that] a reasonably careful person would do or did something [that]
a reasonable person would not do under circumstances similar to those
shown by the evidence in the case, which caused an injury due to an in-
fringement or a deprivation of the resident's rights. 199
Under the RRS, nursing-home residents can therefore sue nursing
homes and seek actual damages for a violation of the resident's rights as set
forth in the statute.2"' The legislature did not define the term "actual damag-
es," but from a plain reading of the statute, it appears that any damages re-
sulting from an injury caused by "an infringement or a deprivation of the
resident's rights" could be recoverable.20'
c. Application: Koch v. Northport Health Services ofArkansas
The Arkansas Supreme Court first heard cases involving the RRS in
2005, including Koch v. Northport Health Services of Arkansas. °2 In that
case, the appellant, Linda Koch, after her mother died, filed a complaint
against her deceased mother's nursing home and its related companies for
medical malpractice, negligence, wrongful death, and violations of the
RRS.2 3 The trial court awarded a verdict for the defense on the medical
malpractice, wrongful death, and RRS claims from the jury's interrogato-
ries.2°' Initially, the judge declared a mistrial on the negligence claim.20 5
Eventually, however, the trial judge applied the jury's answers to interroga-
tories from the RRS claim to the ordinary negligence claim.20 6 Using those
answers, the judge found for the defense on that claim as well.207
198. See id. § 20-10-1204 (LEXIS Supp. 2005); see also 42 C.F.R. § 483.10 (2006).
199. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-10-1209 (LEXIS Supp. 2005).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 361 Ark. 192, 205 S.W.3d 754 (2005).
203. Id. at 195, 205 S.W.3d at 757.
204. Id., 205 S.W.3d at 758.
205. Id., 205 S.W.3d at 758.
206. Id., 205 S.W.3d at 758.
207. Id., 205 S.W.3d at 758.
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Koch appealed the verdict." 8 One of her points on appeal was that the
judge should not have used the jury's answers to interrogatories on the RRS
claim in order to decide the issue of ordinary negligence. 20 9 Koch contended
that the judge should have declared a mistrial on the ordinary negligence
claim instead.21 The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed, holding that the ordi-
nary negligence claim and the RRS claim were two separate claims requir-
ing separate analyses and findings of fact."' The trial court could not simply
apply the answers to interrogatories on one claim to the other.21 2 So long as
the facts of the case were in dispute, the jury should have been free to make
different conclusions on the facts for the RRS claim and the ordinary negli-
gence claim.213 Therefore, separate interrogatories were required for the or-
dinary negligence claim. 214 The Koch court essentially held that negligence
with regard to the RRS was different from ordinary negligence, and courts
should not restrict themselves to applying the same analysis and findings of
fact to the two causes of action.1 5
IV. REASONING
The Arkansas Supreme Court decided five main points in Health Facil-
ities Management Corp.; however, for purposes of this note, only three is-
sues will be addressed in detail.216 First, this section will discuss whether or
not Management was a proper defendant in a suit for violation of the Resi-
dent's Rights Statute.1 7 Second, this section will look at whether or not the
jury's verdicts in favor of the defendant on the wrongful death and medical
malpractice claims effectively exonerated Healthcare from any liability un-
der a theory of violation of the Resident's Rights Statute. 218 Finally, this
section will explore Healthcare's request for remittitur. 9
208. Koch, 361 Ark. at 196, 205 S.W.3d at 758.
209. Id. at 200, 205 S.W.3d at 761.
210. Id. at 202, 205 S.W.3d at 762.
211. Id. at 200, 205 S.W.3d at 761.
212. See id. at 201, 205 S.W.3d at 762.
213. Id. at 201, 205 S.W.3d at 762.
214. Koch, 361 Ark. at 202, 205 S.W.3d at 762.
215. Id., 205 S.W.3d at 762.
216. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, No. 05-90, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *7
(Feb. 9, 2006). The other issues involved the violation of a motion in limine, which the court
held did not require a mistrial, and the reinstatement of the circuit court's decision to reduce
the post-judgment interest rate to seven percent. Id. at *30, 34.
217. See infra Part IV.A.
218. See infra Part IV.B.
219. See infra Part 1V.C.
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A. The Licensee Issue
The court first considered whether the Estate could maintain a cause of
action against Management for a violation of Ms. Smith's resident's rights
under the RRS. 220 The plain language of the Resident's Rights Statute pro-
vides that a plaintiff may maintain a cause of action against a licensee of a
nursing home for violations of that resident's rights.22' Management argued
that the circuit court lacked the authority to decide that Management was a
"de facto" licensee when the statute itself did not create such a category.
222
The Estate countered that the court should construe the term "licensee" to
include any group "establishing, conducting, managing, or operating" a
nursing-home facility by reading the term in conjunction with other statuto-
ry language. 223 For its second point of rebuttal, the Estate urged that the Ar-
kansas General Assembly's intent was to allow residents to maintain actions
against such management entities. 224 The Estate's final contention was that
the Arkansas Supreme Court should affirm the circuit court's ruling for
common sense reasons because Management "was either a licensee in fact,
or had committed numerous criminal acts in managing the [nursing home]
without a license, and, thus, should be held accountable. 2 2 5
In ruling on this issue, the Arkansas Supreme Court used a de novo
standard of review.226 The court began by looking at the statute and deter-
mining that its plain language provided that only a licensee is subject to suit
under its provisions.227 The court then considered another provision of the
statute, which provided that "[n]o long-term care facility or related institu-
tion shall be established, conducted, or maintained in this state without a
license., 228 Looking at the licensure requirements of a long-term care facility
contained in Arkansas Code Annotated section 20-10-224 and the definition
of "licensee" in Black's Law Dictionary, the court determined that Man-
agement was not a licensee under the statute. 229 Furthermore, the court
struck down the Estate's legislative intent argument, finding no mention of a
"de facto" licensee or other evidence that the General Assembly intended to
include entities such as Management.2 10 The court then reversed the judg-
220. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *7.
221. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-10-1209 (LEXIS Supp. 2005).
222. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *7.
223. Id. at *8.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at *9.
227. Id. at *10.
228. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *9-10 (quoting ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-10-224(a) (Repl. 2000)).
229. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *10.
230. Id. at*11.
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ment against Management with respect to the Resident's Rights Statute
claim. 23
1
B. Application of Koch
The remainder of the appeal addressed only Healthcare.232 Healthcare
argued that because the jury ruled against the Estate on its claims for medi-
cal malpractice and wrongful death, the jury could not have found in favor
of the Estate on the Resident's Rights claim.233 This argument hinged on the
fact that the Estate presented no evidence supporting a violation of Ms.
Smith's rights apart from the evidence used to support the other causes of
action.234 At trial, the court instructed the jury that in answering each inter-
rogatory, it should not consider any element of the other interrogatories.235
Therefore, Healthcare argued that any damages attributed to a violation of
Ms. Smith's resident's rights would have to be supported by an element
unique to the Resident's Rights claim.236 The only element of the Resident's
Rights claim not encompassed in the other causes of action was "the right to
be treated courteously. '237 Building on its argument, Healthcare claimed that
there was no evidence of any actual damages suffered by Ms. Smith related
to discourteous treatment.238 Finally, Healthcare argued that the language of
the Resident's Rights Statute did not allow for damages for "mental suffer-
ing without a physical injury. 239
The Arkansas Supreme Court began its opinion with regard to this ar-
gument by stating the appropriate standard of review for the denial of a mo-
tion for directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict.240 The court then established that Koch v. Northport Health Services of
Arkansas 4' would govern its decision on this point.242 The court in Koch
held that when there is a claim for ordinary negligence and another claim
under a statutory cause of action, and the facts are in dispute, the jury can
231. Id. at*12.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *12-13.
236. Id. at *13.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at *13-14 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tucker, 353 Ark. 730, 739, 120
S.W.3d 61, 66-67 (2003)). On appeal, the court will look at whether or not the trial court's
verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Id. at *14.
241. 361 Ark. 192, 205 S.W.3d 754 (2005).
242. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *14.
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reach different conclusions on the facts for each claim. 243 Therefore, in this
case, the jury did not have to reach the same findings of fact on the Resi-
dent's Rights Statute claim as it did on the other claims. 2" Thus, even if the
Estate did not present evidence of discourteous treatment, the jury was free
to find Healthcare liable for violations of the Resident's Rights Statute. 45
The court also applied Koch to the damages phase of the verdict and
held that the jury was free to consider elements included in the other causes
of action when assessing damages for violations of Ms. Smith's resident's
rights.246 In this case, for instance, the Estate received a $38,000 verdict
against Healthcare for negligence.247 The court held that the same elements
used to assess damages on the negligence claim could be used in determin-
ing damages for the Resident's Rights Statute claim. 24 8 Therefore, the jury
was able to award damages for "the injuries resulting from the van accident,
any weight loss, pressure sores, and contractures, as well as other injuries
testified to by the witnesses" under both the negligence claim and the Resi-
dent's Rights Statute claim.249
C. Remittitur
Healthcare further argued that the jury's verdict of $700,000 for viola-
tions of the Resident's Rights Statute was excessive and the result of preju-
dice. 2"° The court's standard of review was to review the proof in a light
most favorable to the appellee, the Estate. 251 The court sought to determine
whether the verdict shocked the conscience of the court, whether the jury
demonstrated passion or prejudice in reaching its award, and whether the
damages were excessive and not sustained by the evidence.252
The court began its inquiry by stating that there was "ample evidence"
of the violation of Ms. Smith's rights.253 The court then concluded that the
jury's verdict was not the result of passion or prejudice.254 The only question
remaining on the issue of remittitur was whether the verdict shocked the
conscience of the court.25 In making its determination, the court quoted
243. Id. at *15.
244. Id. at *16.
245. Id.
246. Id. at *17.
247. Id. at *5.
248. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *17.
249. Id.
250. Id. at *30-31.
251. Id. at*31.
252. Id.
253. Id. at *32.
254. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *32.
255. Id.
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language from the Resident's Rights Statute setting forth the right to health
care and other services, as well as the "right to be treated courteously, fairly,
and with the fullest measure of dignity. '256 The court concluded that Ms.
Smith had suffered from several lapses of care and that the nursing home
treated her without dignity and in violation of the statute; therefore, the Es-
tate was entitled to actual damages.257 Without going into any standards for
quantifying an award for violations of the Resident's Rights Statute, the
court concluded that the jury's verdict of $700,000 did not require a remitti-
tur
2 58
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Health Facilities Manage-
ment Corp. v. Hughes reveals both strengths and weaknesses in the Resi-
dent's Rights Statute. First of all, the court's decision on the licensee issue
was faithful to the statute's goal of improving the quality of patient care. 59
However, the vague civil enforcement provision of the statute allowed the
court to interpret the statute in such a way that it punishes nursing homes
more than it protects residents. 260 The Arkansas legislature and judicial sys-
tem need to make adjustments in order to strengthen this weakness and
make the statute more effective.
A. The Court's Resolution of the Licensee Issue Maintains the Integrity of
the Statute
Placing liability for lapses in care on the licensee of a long-term care
facility best serves the purpose of the Resident's Rights Statute-to improve
the quality of care to nursing home residents. The court's reasoning focused
on the generalized definition of "licensee" in Black's Law Dictionary and
the statute's plain language.2 6' The requirements and materials for licensure
of long-term care facilities in Arkansas bolster the court's decision even
more, making clear why it was appropriate for the legislature to limit liabili-
ty to licensees.2 2 The Office of Long Term Care, in its materials detailing
the process for licensure of long-term care facilities, defines "licensee" as
256. Idat *33 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-10-1204(a)(21) (Repl. 2000)).
257. Id. at *33-34.
258. Id. at *34.
259. See id. at *12.
260. Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122 at *12.
261. See supra Part V.A.
262. See Office of Long Term Care, Rules and Regulations for Nursing Homes,
https://www.medicaid.state.ar.us/Download/general/units/oltc/regs/nfregs.pdf [hereinafter
OLTC].
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"any state, municipality, political subdivision, institution, public, or private
corporation, association, individual, partnership, or any other entity to whom
a license is issued for the purpose of operating the nursing home, who shall
assume primary responsibility for complying with approved standards for
the institution. 263
The Office of Long Term Care's definition of "licensee," read in con-
junction with the civil enforcement provision, fulfills the purposes of the
Resident's Rights Statute.2 6 It is logical that the party assuming "primary
responsibility for complying with approved standards" should be the party
responsible for damages for lapses in a resident's care or rights.265 While the
Estate attempted to argue for a reading of the statute that would include "de
facto" licensees, it had no basis for the argument.266 Had the court recog-
nized "de facto" licensees, the integrity of the Resident's Rights Statute may
have been undermined. If the purpose is to improve quality of care to nurs-
ing home residents, any liability for a lapse in care should fall on the party
who has assumed responsibility for complying with approved standards.
Furthermore, although the Estate tried to argue that if Management was op-
erating the Nursing Home without its own license it was breaking the law,
267
there is no requirement under Arkansas's licensure procedure for every enti-
ty involved with a nursing home to obtain a license; in fact, because the de-
finition of "licensee" references "primary responsibility," the obvious con-
clusion is that only one entity may be a licensee.268
The court's reading of the Resident's Rights Statute on the licensee is-
sue was correct, because a long-term care facility license in Arkansas co-
veys to the licensee primary responsibility. Only one party may bear prima-
ry responsibility, and therefore there can be no "de facto" licensee. Moreo-
ver, it achieves the purposes of the Resident's Rights Statute by encouraging
the licensees, who have assumed responsibility, to carry out their responsi-
bility and improve patient care.
B. The Double Recovery Allowed Following the Hughes Decision Un-
justly Punishes Nursing Home Defendants
While the court reached the right conclusion on the licensure issue, its
opinion on the issue of recovery is troubling. The purpose of compensatory
damages is to compensate the plaintiff for actual injuries or damages suf-
263, Id. at 7.
264. Compare id. with ARK. CoDE ANN. § 20-10-1209 (LEXIS Sup. 2005).
265. OLTC, supra note 262.
266. See supra Part IV.A.
267. See supra Part W.A.
268. See OLTC, supra note 262.
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fered as the result of the defendant's conduct.269 Compensatory damages are
not meant to punish a defendant or unjustly enrich a plaintiff.27 ° The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court's holding, which applies its decision in Koch, essentially
amounts to the allowance of double recovery. A jury following instructions
based on the Hughes decision could basically consider damages included in
assessing damages for other causes of action when assessing damages under
a Resident's Rights Statute claim.2 7' Therefore a plaintiff could recover
damages from a fall twice-once under a negligence theory and again on a
Resident's Rights claim. Such double recovery is punitive, going beyond
compensating the plaintiff to actually punishing the defendant. The plaintiff
should not be able to recover damages for the same injury twice. Damages
recovered for a Resident's Rights claim should therefore be limited to dam-
ages not recovered on any other theory.
Arkansas should reform its Resident's Rights Statute to limit jury
awards, or in the alternative, the Arkansas Supreme Court should establish a
clear, straightforward, and just standard for applying the statute and assess-
ing damages. It is time for the state to take a rational, reasoned approach to
the nursing-home crisis that will improve the quality of life of residents
while also bolstering the industry's ability to sustain itself.172 Arkansas can-
not rely on litigation to solve the problems of the nursing home industry. 73
As it stands now, the RRS in combination with the Arkansas Supreme
Court's decision allows juries to punish nursing homes with compensatory
damages-an idea antithetical to the foundations of the justice system. 74
One option would be for Arkansas to adopt reforms similar to those
adopted by the Florida legislature2 75 in order to decrease the dangerously
punitive nature of the current civil enforcement provision of the RRS. Oth-
erwise Arkansas runs the risk of going the way of Florida and running insur-
ance companies out of the state, making providing nursing home care even
more difficult than it currently is. Alternatively, the Arkansas Supreme
Court should establish a clear and just standard for applying the statute and
assessing damages. Limiting damages to those not recovered under any oth-
er theory would prevent double recovery and avoid the problem of punish-
ing defendants under the veil of compensatory damages. If the legislature or
the court steps in to make these changes, the Arkansas Resident's Rights
269. See Manhattan Credit Co., Inc. v. Skirvin, 228 Ark. 913, 915-17, 311 S.W.2d 168,
170 (1958).
270. See id. at 917, 311 S.W.2d 168. The court distinguished compensatory damages
from damages used to punish a defendant. Id.
271. See Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122, at *8.
272. See Brady, supra note 4.
273. See id.
274. See Health Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 2006 Ark. LEXIS 122.
275. See supra Part III.C.2.d.
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Statute would be aimed at meeting its goals in a more effective way while
not unnecessarily crippling the industry supplying care to nursing home
residents.
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